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The Rogue Landlord: Tenants’ 
Recourse Against Self-Help for 
Damages Following a Residential 
Lease Termination 
 
John N. Mansella, Esq.* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Rhode Island Residential Landlord Tenant Act1 (the Act) 
proscribes the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, 
while also serving an important consumer protection purpose. 
After termination of a residential lease, the Act specifies the  
rights and method by which a landlord may proceed against a 
former tenant on certain claims.2 Some landlords may choose to 
“go rogue” and utilize self-help, not only for possession of the 
property (we have all heard the horror stories about locks being 
changed without a court order), but also for the amount that the 
landlord believes is owed in damages. “Going rogue” on damages 
means trying to collect the amount themselves or furnishing the 
alleged amount to a consumer reporting agency (CRA)3 or third- 
 
* John N. Mansella is a solo practitioner licensed in the state and  
federal courts of Rhode Island and Massachusetts. He focuses primarily on 
employment litigation, consumer protection issues, and personal injury. He 
holds a Juris Doctor from Roger Williams University School of Law, a Master 
of Arts in Communication from Emerson College, and a Bachelor of Arts from 
Providence College in both Political Science and English. 
1. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-1 to -57 (2017). 
2. Id. § 34-18-43. 
3. A “consumer reporting agency” is 
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative 
nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice 
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other 
 
445 
 446 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:445 
 
party debt collector (TPDC). This Article takes the position that, 
following the termination of a residential lease, there is no set of 
facts under which a landlord may attempt to collect monies 
against the former tenant or furnish the alleged amount owed to a 
CRA, without facing potential causes of action from the tenant, 
unless the landlord first obtains a judgment in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.4 
As the basis for this position, there are two sections of the 
 
 
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer 
reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of 
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing 
consumer reports. 
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2012). A “consumer report” is 
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used 
or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose 
of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for— 
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes; 
(B) employment purposes; or 
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this 
title. 
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (with certain exclusions). 
In Rhode Island, a “Consumer Reporting Agency” is 
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative 
nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice 
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other 
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer 
reports to third parties. 
19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.9-3(2) (2017). A “[d]ebt collector” is 
any person who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the 
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to 
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 
owed or due another. 
Id. § 19-14.9-3(5) (with certain enumerated exclusions that follow in the 
statute). 
4. To the extent that any liability may attach to a TPDC, note that the 
Rhode Island Fair Debt Collection Practices Act contains an exception for 
debt collectors acting on behalf of a landlord. See § 19-14.9-1. However, this 
Article does not pertain to a “charge” or a “bill” for a sum-certain, making 
subsection (h) inapplicable, as further discussed herein. See id. 
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Rhode Island Residential Landlord Tenant Act5 which, read 
together, form both a sword and shield for the former tenant 
against careless or arbitrary debt collection attempts by a landlord 
or its agent. A landlord that attempts to collect upon an amount 
alleged to be due and owed following termination of the lease, 
without first obtaining a judgment, is engaging in reckless “self- 
help” for the recovery of damages.6 Similar to the prohibition on 
using self-help to regain possession of rented property (evictions 
without due process),7 likewise, self-help remedies are not 
available to the landlord here. The landlord—at a minimum— 
may expose him or herself to a negligence claim, in addition to 
other potential claims that may not otherwise be available to the 
former tenant absent these two sections of the Act. In this way, 
the Act is a tenant’s sword and shield against self-help actions by 
a landlord for recovery of damages that could cause financial or 
economic harm to the former tenant. 
A negligence action in particular may seem to be far outside 
the realm of landlord-tenant law where recovery of damages is the 
only subject at issue and would appear to be the last cause of 
action one would contemplate in association with the Act. 
However, this Article demonstrates how a landlord’s self-help 
attempt to recover monies allegedly owed by a former tenant can 
easily meet the elements necessary for a negligence claim. This 
Article also shows that former landlords owe a “duty of care” to 
former tenants. No such claims discussed here, however, would be 
available to the former tenant if the landlord pursued the 
statutorily devised procedure in the Act to recover the landlord’s 
alleged damages after lease termination.8 
There are, of course, other consumer debt or breach of 
contract actions that one tends to see on the court calendars in 
Rhode Island, such as medical provider or credit card debt, loans 
or other book accounts, where negligence would not be an 
available cause of action. First, note that this Article is not about 
a breach of contract action—an important distinction that will be 
discussed later. Second, it is not uncommon for alleged debts by 
 
 
5. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-5(a), -43 (2017). 
6. Id. § 34-18-44, entitled “Self-help recovery of possession prohibited.” 
7. See id. § 34-18-34. 
8. Id. § 34-18-56 (emphasis added). 
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medical providers or credit lenders to be turned over to a TPDC or 
the amount furnished to a CRA. These alleged amounts can 
usually be substantiated by the book account or ledger. While 
other issues may arise in the consumer’s defense of book account 
style debt collection actions, negligence would almost always be a 
“reach” because the initial threshold—establishing a financial 
“duty of care” from the creditor to the consumer—is nearly 
impossible. By contrast, this Article discusses how these two 
sections of the Act help a former tenant establish a duty of care for 
a negligence claim under Rhode Island common law, as well as 
other claims. 
There is also a garden variety of breach of contract actions, 
such as the homeowner and kitchen remodeling contractor that 
may be unable to stop quarreling over whether money is indeed 
owed for that unsightly kitchen update with the pewter yellow 
counter tops that were supposed to be “indie green.” This type of 
breach of contract action almost always involves issues of fact and 
law that cannot be determined with any mathematical certainty, 
which is why furnishing an amount to a CRA would be risky for 
the contractor. However, even if the contractor did furnish the 
alleged amount to a CRA, the contractor may bear liability under 
other law while, the homeowner, for example, would not 
necessarily have a state common law negligence claim against the 
contractor. 
This Article is limited to a discussion of how self-help for 
recovery of damages after lease termination exposes a landlord to 
claims under at least two theories: one in common law, and the 
other statutory. Discussion of certain matters arising out of 
insolvency, such as bankruptcy or state receivership proceedings, 
are outside of the scope of this Article. However, the analysis 
presented herein should be considered by those with potential 
interest in applying this reasoning to claims filed in such 
proceedings by landlords or assignees of alleged debt owed to a 
landlord following a lease termination. 
I. STARTING WITH THE BASICS: THE TWO SECTIONS OF THE ACT 
The two sections of the Act at issue here are Rhode Island 
General Laws sections 34-18-43 and 34-18-5(a), which read as 
follows: 
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§ 34-18-43. Remedy after termination. If the rental 
agreement is terminated, the landlord has a claim for 
possession, for a sum for reasonable use and occupation 
subsequent to the termination, and for actual damages 
for breach of the rental agreement and reasonable 
attorney’s fees.9 
§     34-18-5. Administration of remedies— 
Enforcement. (a) The remedies provided by this chapter 
shall be so administered that an aggrieved party may 
recover appropriate damages and injunctive relief, 
including temporary restraining orders, as set forth in 
§ 34-18-6. The aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate 
damages.10 
These two sections of the Act appear to require a procedure 
that must be followed by the landlord in the event that either 
party terminates a lease agreement, thereby removing this action 
from the standard breach of contract realm grounded in common 
law. The Legislature’s specific word choice in these two sections is 
at the crux of this argument. The words “claim,” “sum,” 
“reasonable,” and the phrase “use and occupation,” all indicate 
that following termination of the lease, the landlord only has a 
claim, and never a sum-certain.11  In other words, the Act does  
not describe how “sum” is to be computed so that the “sum” may 
be pursued by a landlord, or its debt collector, without granting 
potential causes of action to the former tenant. 
Furthermore, the phrase “use and occupation,” rather than 
“rent,” is a critical distinction, and not mere semantics.12 The 
Legislature’s word choice further demonstrates that the landlord 
has only an unripened claim, and more accurately reflects the 
reality that various potential factual issues inevitably arise after 
 
 
9. Id. § 34-18-43 (emphasis added). 
10. Id. § 34-18-5(a) (emphasis added). 
11. See id. § 34-18-23. 
12. As acknowledged by the Rhode Island Supreme Court over a century 
ago, “the rentable value of the estate, as in an ordinary action for use and 
occupation, affords the fairest and most palpable test of the value of the use 
of the interest in it represented by the plaintiff.” Knowles v. Harris, 5 R.I. 
402, 404 (1858). Therefore, the phrase “use and occupation,” rather than 
“rent,” in the Act indicates a proactive decision for the particular wording to 
have significance. 
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the lease has been terminated. For example: does a landlord- 
tenant relationship still exist? If the tenant vacated, but the lease 
is still in effect, is the tenant still using and occupying the 
premises as defined in the statute? These are issues for a finder of 
fact. If the Legislature meant for a landlord to be able to claim a 
sum-certain and turn bills for unpaid rent directly over to a 
collection agency without court involvement, “rent” would have 
been the clearer word choice. “Use and occupation” encompasses 
factors beyond a simple “amount due” mathematical formula. 
Next, the key word here, “reasonable,” whether or not 
combined with the word “claim” in the same section, would require 
a fact-finder to determine the “sum” to which the statute refers.13 
What is “reasonable” necessarily invokes the role of a fact-finder, 
as reasonableness may vary depending on the facts, 
circumstances, evidence, and the person(s) making the finding of 
fact. Finally, where the “aggrieved party” is the landlord,  a 
myriad of questions may arise as to whether or not the landlord 
complied with mitigation efforts, creating innumerable factual 
issues and rendering a sum-certain for the debt impossible under 
any set of facts.14 
Perhaps what is even more important about these two 
sections of the Act is the converse: what language is not included. 
For instance, title 34, section 18-24 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws does not say that, after termination, the landlord is owed  
the monthly rent at the rate of X dollars as found in the written or 
verbal lease to calculate the sum total due.15 It does not say that 
the landlord “may take possession” or “falls into possession 
following termination,” but rather that the landlord has a claim 
for possession. Some final decision maker must ripen that claim 
into a judgment for or against possession, and for an amount that 
is either due or not due. In the absence of that judgment, all that 
exists is the landlord’s claim for damages. 
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY THRESHOLD 
That these two sections exist gives former tenants a prima 
facie claim of negligence by being able to surmount the first 
 
 
13. § 34-18-23. 
14. Id. § 34-18-5(a). 
15. Id. § 34-18-43. 
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element: duty of care. These two sections, taken together, 
unmistakably exist to protect a tenant by not only forcing a 
landlord to mitigate his or her damages, but also to mandate that 
the landlord’s claim must ripen into a judgment in order for it to 
be enforceable, and to prevent self-help.16 Because these two 
sections exist primarily for a public policy benefit of a  specific 
class of consumer—the former tenant—a landlord who engages in 
self-help for alleged debt recovery may be subject to a negligence 
action. For instance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, for over 
seventy years, has held, 
where there is the violation of an ordinance that prohibits 
the doing of a certain act or commands its performance 
and a person is injured by reason of the very commission 
or omission of such act, . . . the ordinance may be 
admitted in evidence and its violation proved as evidence 
of negligence. In Oates v. Union Railroad Co., . . . this 
court says: “Although the violation of the statute or 
ordinance may not itself be a ground of action, yet if the 
violation of the duty imposed for the safety of the public is 
the cause of the injury evidence of the violation is prima 
facie evidence of negligence.”17 
Although in Sitko the Court found no injury to the plaintiff 
that was the “natural and probable result of the defendant’s 
negligence,”18 the Court’s protocol of looking to an ordinance to 
find a basis for negligence was relied upon over fifty years later in 
Sanchez v. Guy19 and still remains good law today. In short, the 
existence of an express public policy bolsters a  plaintiff’s 
argument that a duty of care existed and was owed to the 
plaintiff.20 An ordinance intended for the safety of the public, in 
other words, was part of the Sitko Court’s basis for finding a duty 
of care.21 Therefore, whether in the form of an ordinance or 
statute, an express public policy directly aimed at the safety or 
 
 
16. Id. §§ 34-18-5(a), -43. 
17. Sitko v. Jastrzebski, 27 A.2d 178, 179 (R.I. 1942) (quoting Oates v. 
Union R.R. Co., 63 A. 657, 677 (R.I. 1906)). 
18. Id. 
19. No. 01-0294, slip op. at 6 (R.I. Super. Nov. 23, 2004). 
20. Id. at 7. 
21. Sitko, 27 A.2d at 179. 
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protection of certain persons can be instrumental in establishing a 
prima facie claim under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act.22  However, without any public policy in  existence, 
a former tenant would not necessarily have the opportunity to 
make out a prima facie case against the rogue self-help landlord 
for any cause of action that so requires an express public policy, in 
the form of statute, ordinance, or otherwise. 
III. A USEFUL HYPOTHETICAL 
To illustrate the points in this Article, it is useful here to 
assume a hypothetical situation where a tenant (let us call the 
hypothetical tenant Terri Tenant) terminates the residential lease 
prior to its expiration. At the time of termination, the landlord 
(our hypothetical landlord is Larry Landlord) has three months 
left in the lease where Terri Tenant was paying $1,500 per month. 
Larry Landlord may assume he is entitled to $4,500. Assume 
further that Larry Landlord places one online advertisement for 
the premises only days after the termination. The cost of the 
advertisement is $100, and the advertisement runs for one week 
on a popular apartment rental website. However, Larry Landlord 
receives no serious inquiries and takes no further action. 
The remaining three months go by and the apartment 
remains unoccupied. Larry Landlord receives no rent for  these 
last three months of the lease. Near the end of the three months 
no one is in the apartment, and despite Larry Landlord keeping 
the heat on at, what he believes to be a sufficiently warm, fifty- 
seven degrees, a small pipe burst due to cold weather. Larry 
Landlord has to pay $700 to repair the pipe. Larry Landlord then 
proceeds under the assumption that he is owed three months’ rent 
for a total of $4,500, plus $100 for the advertisement, plus another 
$700 for the pipe repair. Larry Landlord then takes the next step 
of either furnishing this information to a CRA or furnishing the 
amount to a debt collector. The debt collector may or may not 
furnish the information to a CRA. 
Several months later, Terri Tenant applies for credit 
elsewhere and is informed that she has a collection account for an 
unpaid balance of $5,300 to Larry Landlord (or Larry’s third-party 
debt collector). She is denied credit, and thereby suffers financial 
 
22. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 to -29 (2017). 
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harm. Terri Tenant later obtains credit, but at a substantially 
higher interest rate and with fees that she would not have had to 
pay absent the alleged unpaid balance due to Larry Landlord. 
Terri Tenant then has difficulty obtaining a mortgage, and the 
mortgage lender requires a larger down payment than  it 
otherwise would have required absent the collection account.  
Terri Tenant also applies for a job, but is denied as a result of a 
credit check that reflected the collection account. In this 
hypothetical, Larry Landlord was careless because he believed he 
was owed a sum-certain and never filed a civil action to recover 
his alleged claim for damages. 
The thought turning in the reader’s mind at this point is 
likely something along the lines of, “Why is this different than any 
other contract action? The landlord still can just sue the former 
tenant. What is the point?” Or, “Are there other statutes  that  
give a consumer such claims in other areas of law?” Yes, of course. 
The point here is that certain sections of the Act exist specifically 
for the former tenant’s protection.23 That alone creates a basis for 
the former tenant to establish a negligence claim for the landlord’s 
conduct, or potentially pursue a claim under other consumer 
protection theories. By contrast, in other common breach of 
contract scenarios, one party can file suit against the other to 
recover damages, whether the breach is based on a book account 
(e.g., a credit card issuer or medical provider), or upon some other 
area of contract law (e.g., the pewter yellow versus the indie green 
counter top fiasco). Certainly, the homeowner may file an action 
against the contractor for breach of contract based on the 
allegation that the contractor did not perform as agreed. 
Conversely, the contractor may file an action against the 
homeowner for failing to pay for the work. And similarly, a 
medical provider or credit card issuer may file a breach of contract 
action for non-payment of a book account. 
However, because two sections within the Act require 
judgment, they effectively serve as a safety valve to protect the 
consumer.24 In that sense, the two sections of the Act inherently 
form a consumer protection mechanism—not only in mandating 
procedural due process for recovery of post-lease termination 
 
23. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-5(a), -43 (2017). 
24. Id. 
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damages—but also for the former tenant to have notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.25 Thus, because the statute is in place to 
protect the consumer against collection activity or furnishing to a 
CRA without obtaining a judgment, the Legislature has, whether 
it intended to or not, created a public policy that protects the 
tenant. Of course, a landlord could attempt to secure a settlement 
without litigation; however, a settlement not reduced to a 
judgment would appear to fall short of satisfying the Act. For 
instance, the Act clearly contemplates the problem of 
unconscionable agreements between a landlord and tenant: 
§ 34-18-13. Unconscionability. 
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds: 
(1) A rental agreement or any provision thereof was 
unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to 
enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the 
agreement without the unconscionable provision, or 
limit the application of any unconscionable provision 
to avoid an unconscionable result; or 
(2) A settlement in which a party waives or agrees to 
forego a claim or right under this chapter or under a 
rental agreement was unconscionable when made, 
the court may refuse to enforce the settlement, 
enforce the remainder of the settlement without the 
unconscionable provisions, or limit the application of 
any unconscionable provision to avoid an 
unconscionable result. 
(b) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by 
the court upon its own motion, the parties shall be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as 
to the setting, purpose and effect of the rental agreement 
or settlement to aid the court in making the 
determination.26 
If a landlord has already furnished the alleged amount and 
attempts to secure a settlement agreement, and release of claims 
thereafter, there is arguably a problem with unequal bargaining 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. § 34-18-13. 
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power between the parties. Even where the landlord attempts to 
secure a settlement before furnishing, there is still potential for 
litigation over unconscionability, fraud, coercion, or even duress, 
given that it is expressly contemplated by the Act.27 Even though 
the Act contemplates these problems mostly with rental 
agreements,28 the disparity that exists between a landlord and 
former tenant could give rise to claims against the landlord in how 
the agreement was formed, or even whether it is enforceable. 
Therefore, the landlord’s most prudent and safest course of action 
is to pursue a civil action against the former tenant. Any 
agreement reached should be presented to the Court for review 
and a determination as to whether it will be reduced to writing 
and entered as a judgment. Any other course of action constitutes 
self-help for damages, and the penumbras of the Act, as cited 
herein, arguably weighs against such conduct.29 
IV. A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE 
A. Sections 34-18-5(a) and 34-18-43 Create a Duty of Care to the 
Former Tenant 
A former tenant may be able to cross the threshold for the 
first element of a negligence claim, duty of care, if a landlord 
utilized self-help to recover damages. The duty of care analysis 
and standard of review, however, must be carefully scrutinized in 
order to potentially apply it to our hypothetical scenario.  To 
begin, it is well settled that “[t]o properly set forth ‘a claim for 
negligence, a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty 
owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, 
proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, 
and the actual loss or damage.’”30  However, a defendant cannot  
be held liable under any theory of negligence “unless the 
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.”31 Whether a legal duty 
exists, in any given case, is a question of law for the court.32 If 
 
 
27. See id. §§ 34-18-3, -13. 
28. Id. § 34-18-13. 
29. Id. §§ 34-18-5, -13, -43. 
30. Brown v. Stanley, 84 A.3d 1157, 1161–62 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Mills v. 
State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003)). 
31. Id. at 1162. 
32. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 129–30 (R.I. 2008) (citing Martin v. 
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the court concludes that no duty exists, “the trier of fact has 
nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must be 
granted.”33 A legal duty is found on a case-by-case basis,34 and a 
court will examine a number of relevant factors, which include: 
“the relationship of the parties, the scope and burden of the 
obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public policy 
considerations, and notions of fairness.”35 
While there is no determinative rule in place, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court has consistently applied a five-factor test 
when determining whether a duty of care exists in a particular 
case.36 Those factors are: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, 
(3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of 
preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden 
to the defendant and the consequences to the community 
for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach.37 
If a landlord engages in self-help against a former tenant to 
recover monies allegedly due following a lease termination, and 
ignores Rhode Island General Laws sections 34-18-43 and 34-18- 
5(a),38 the five factors enumerated by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court would be satisfied.39 These two sections of the Act form a 
clear and unmistakable duty to the public—namely, to a specific 
class of persons—in this case, residential former tenants of 
landlords who are engaged in the trade or practice of leasing 
residential dwellings. Additionally, these two sections exist to 
afford both parties, including tenants, notice and an opportunity 
to be heard to prevent self-help by a landlord to the former tenant, 
 
Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005)). 
33. Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1252 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Berardis 
v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2009)). 
34. Brown, 84 A.3d at 1162 (citing Martin, 871 A.2d at 915). 
35. Gushlaw, 42 A.3d at 1252 (quoting Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 
705 (R.I. 2003)). 
36. Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987). 
37. Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 814–15 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Banks, 
522 A.2d at 1225). 
38. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-43, 5(a) (2017). 
39. Woodruff, 91 A.3d at 815 (quoting Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225). 
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or vice versa. 
When a landlord violates a statute, which alone creates a duty 
to the public, a plaintiff may rely on the violation as evidence that 
an existing duty was breached.40 The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court also stated long ago that “the violation of a statute or an 
ordinance [is] not of itself ground for a civil action unless such 
right was annexed thereto,41 . . . or unless it prescribed a duty for 
the benefit of a particular class of persons.”42 Additionally,  
roughly twenty years after the Court’s holding in Grant v. Slater 
Mill and Power Co., the Court in Oates v. Union Railroad Co. 
expressly held that if a statute imposed a duty intended to protect 
the safety of the public, violation of that statute would be prima 
facie evidence of negligence, but would not constitute negligence 
per se.43 In total, the case law supports the idea that “a violation 
of a statute, which itself creates a duty to the public, may be relied 
on by a plaintiff as evidence of the existence of a duty and the 
breach of that duty.”44 
These two sections of the Act are designed to protect the 
financial and/or economic safety of a particular class of persons in 
the community—namely, consumers who are residential 
tenants.45 The two sections impose a duty upon a residential 
landlord to pursue its claim against the tenant for a judgment 
regarding what constitutes “reasonable” damages to the landlord 
as a result of the lease termination, or if the landlord has been 
damaged at all (considering the duty to mitigate).46 
Here, had Larry Landlord filed a civil action against the 
former tenant, there would be substantial questions of fact over 
what the “reasonable” damages may have been. Without a 
judgment, there is no way to know whether Larry Landlord 
properly mitigated his damages or paid too much or too little for 
the pipe repair, or advertised enough such that Terri Tenant’s 
 
40. Sanchez v. Guy, No. 01-0294, slip op. at 4 (R.I. Super. Nov. 23, 2004). 
41. Clements v. Tashjoin, 168 A.2d 472, 474 (R.I. 1961) (citing Heeney  
v. Sprague, 11 R.I. 456 (1877)). 
42. Id. at 474–75 (citing Grant v. Slater Mill & Power Co., 14 R.I. 380 
(R.I. 1884)) (emphasis added). 
43. Oates v. Union R.R. Co., 63 A. 675, 677 (R.I. 1906). 
44. Marchakov v. Champagne, C.A. No. 00-1861, 2004 LEXIS 125, at *9 
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 8, 2004). 
45. See Clements, 168 A.2d at 474–75. 
46. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-5, -43 (2017). 
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liability may have been less, more, or zero, because Larry 
Landlord failed to follow section 34-18-43 in the first place (and by 
doing so, also failed to “mitigate” its damages in accordance with 
section 34-18-5(a)).47 
Under the present facts in our hypothetical, all five factors 
enumerated by the Supreme Court48 are satisfied, and thus, 
establishes that a duty of care exists between the landlord and the 
former tenant. Those factors and the reasoning behind each are 
discussed below. 
1. “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff”49 
Larry Landlord carelessly turned over an arbitrary amount of 
alleged monies owed to him to a debt collector and/or furnished 
the alleged amount to a CRA. However, the final “sum” of what 
was “reasonable,” based on the evidence, is not final absent the 
fact-finding function of a court. A collection account on  one’s 
credit report not only damages his or her credit score, but also his 
or her ability to obtain credit in the future as previously discussed. 
It is foreseeable and common knowledge today that furnishing any 
amount allegedly owed to a debt collection agency will result in 
financial or economic harm to an individual. 
2. “[T]he degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an 
injury”50 
In general, the credit and reputation of a former tenant could 
be negatively impacted by a landlord’s self-help attempt at 
recovery of a sum for damages or furnishing an arbitrary “sum” to 
a CRA; thereby, resulting in financial and/or economic injury to 
the former tenant. With the financial life of a former tenant 
negatively impacted or even ruined, that individual may be denied 
credit, offered less favorable borrowing terms, or even forced to 
pay a higher monthly payment on loans or leases had his or her 
credit history not have been unfairly and unlawfully tarnished. A 
plaintiff in this situation could, of course, present evidence of 
being denied credit, paying higher interest rates, or the like, to 
 
47. Id. 
48. Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 814–15 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Banks 
v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987)). 
49. Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225. 
50. Id. 
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show financial or economic injury. While the damage  to 
reputation may be non-economic, if it results in a denial of 
employment or quantifiable economic damages such as higher 
interest rates or down payments for credit, evidence of these 
economic damages could be presented with certainty. 
3. “[T]he closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the injury suffered”51 
Larry Landlord’s self-help conduct would be directly and 
unequivocally connected to the financial and/or economic injury 
suffered by the former tenant. It was Larry Landlord’s self-help 
approach of “taking the law into his own hands” by failing to 
comply with sections 34-18-5(a) and 34-18-43 that would result in 
Terri Tenant’s injury.52 If the landlord had filed a civil action 
seeking damages against the tenant for termination of the lease 
prior to its written expiration and requesting that the court 
determine the amount of damages reduced to a judgment, there 
could be no connection between any resulting financial and/or 
economic injury and the landlord’s conduct. The tenant would 
have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard before a 
report was sent to the credit bureaus. There is, of course, no way 
to predict what the court as fact-finder would determine. The 
court as fact-finder may have found that a higher, lower, or no 
amount was due to the landlord, which further demonstrates the 
lack of any sum-certain in these cases until judgment enters. In 
any event, the tenant would have had the opportunity to be heard 
and to protect his or her credit worthiness by tendering the 
amount found by the court to be due to the landlord, if any was 
found at all. 
However, Larry Landlord computed his own unsubstantiated 
version of the damages due and attempted to recover it by 
furnishing it to a CRA and a TPDC. Hence, Larry Landlord’s 
conduct would be commercially unreasonable and harmful to the 
tenant and would cause financial and/or economic injury. There 
would be no intermediate steps between the landlord’s reporting 
to a credit bureau or furnishing to a TPDC and the financial or 
economic injury. The reporting or furnishing is, in and of itself, 
 
51. Id. 
52. See 34 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-18-5, -43 (2017). 
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the conduct that would cause the injury to the former tenant. 
4. “[T]he policy of preventing future harm”53 
If a landlord, upon termination of the lease by a tenant, is 
allowed to circumvent the landlord’s duty to mitigate damages 
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-5(a)54 and 
to ‘take the law into his or her own hands’ by failing to comply 
with its statutory “claim” for possession and damages pursuant to 
Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-43,55 then these two 
sections of the Act would be rendered completely meaningless. 
Complying with Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-43 is 
not some mere “option” available to the landlord, but rather a 
statutory mandate against self-help that requires judicial 
intervention. These two Act sections were clearly enacted to 
prevent the exact type of harm that occurred to Terri Tenant. If 
these two sections, particularly the filing of a civil action for a 
claim pursuant to section 34-18-43,56 are not followed, then a 
landlord could conjure up any arbitrary amount the landlord 
believes is due. This could potentially ruin a tenant’s financial life 
without the tenant ever having notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, which is implicit by the very nature of the passage into law 
and existence of Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-43.57 
5. “[T]he extent of the burden to the defendant and the 
consequences to the community for imposing a duty to exercise care 
with resulting liability for breach”58 
There is simply no “burden” upon a defendant-landlord to 
comply with sections 34-18-15(a) and 34-18-43.59 Rather, it is the 
law of the State of Rhode Island and not some optional course of 
action to be pursued or not pursued at the whim of a landlord. As 
for the “consequences to the community for imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for breach,”60 these two Act 
 
 
53. Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225. 
54. § 34-18-5(a). 
55. See § 34-18-43. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. 
58. Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225–26 (R.I. 1987). 
59. §§ 34-18-5(a), -43. 
60. Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225. 
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sections exist to protect the tenant community against arbitrary 
and capricious actions taken by landlords without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-43 is clear in 
stating that upon breach by the tenant, the landlord has a “claim” 
for possession and the “reasonable” amount of “use and 
occupation” (of importance is that the statute uses the term “use 
and occupancy” and not “rent”).61 The use of the words “claim”  
and “reasonable,” taken together, provide that the landlord must 
present his or her claim to the court, and that the court, as fact- 
finder, makes a determination of the “reasonable” amount due to 
the landlord, or if any amount is due at all. This is not a “burden” 
to the landlord-defendant—it is the law. 
If the courts allowed landlords to collect any payment amount 
that he or she alleged from former tenants and to send this 
amount into a collections account or to furnish it to a CRA, there 
would be no purpose in the Legislature ever having enacted 
section 34-18-43 in the first place. The danger to the community 
(specifically, to residential tenants) who terminate their lease 
agreements due to some perceived wrong done to them by a 
landlord would be harsh and unfounded. Accordingly, these  
factors delineated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court impose a 
duty of care from a landlord to former tenants.62 
B. Breach of the Duty of Care 
Having established above that a duty of care exists, it next 
must be shown that the landlord breached the duty of care. A 
landlord would breach the above-articulated duty of care to former 
tenants by failing to comply with Rhode Island General Laws 
sections 34-18-5(a) and 34-18-43,63 because these two sections 
were specifically designed to protect the financial or economic 
safety or security of tenants from arbitrary actions by a landlord. 
A landlord who carelessly turns over an alleged debt to a debt 
collector, furnishes the amount to any third-party, or somehow 
uses the alleged amount in any manner without first filing a civil 
action breached the duty of care articulated herein. 
 
61. § 34-18-43. 
62. See Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225–26. 
63. See §§ 34-18-5(a), -43. 
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C. Causation 
But for a landlord’s breach of his or her duty of care, former 
tenants would necessarily have notice and an opportunity to be 
heard to raise affirmative defenses or  counterclaims.  
Additionally, if a judgment was rendered against the former 
tenants, the former tenants could simply pay the judgment to the 
landlord and possibly avoid the furnishing to a CRA or being 
pursued on the judgment by a debt collector. Any number of 
outcomes would be possible. But, these other outcomes all would 
require that the tenant, at the very least, have notice and the 
opportunity to be heard on the matter in accordance with the  
plain language and intent of sections 34-18-5(a) and 34-18-43. 
Accordingly, the end result may or may not result in the tenants 
owing damages to the landlord because, in accordance with these 
two sections, there are questions of fact that must first be 
determined.64 If the landlord followed the Act, no credit reporting 
could take place before a tenant had the opportunity to be heard. 
Therefore, a landlord’s failure to follow the law and instead 
furnish an arbitrary, unsubstantiated, and unfounded amount to a 
debt collector or CRA without first obtaining a judgment, would be 
the actual and proximate cause of any financial and/or economic 
damages upon the former tenant. 
D. Damages 
Importantly, because tenants are consumers and not 
businesses, tenants are not barred by the economic loss doctrine 
from recovering for financial injury in a negligence action.65 In 
upholding the motion justice’s application of the economic loss 
doctrine, the Drexel Court reasoned that “commercial transactions 
are more appropriately suited to resolution through the law of 
contract, than through the law of tort.”66 Using key language 
appropriate to a negligence claim, the Drexel Court also stated, 
 
64. See id. 
65. See Franklin Grove Corp. v. Drexel, 936 A.2d 1272, 1276 (R.I. 2007) 
(“‘[T]he economic loss doctrine is not applicable to consumer transactions.’ 
Thus, although this Court recognizes the economic loss doctrine as a bar to 
recovery, we limit its application to disputes involving commercial entities.” 
(quoting Rousseau v. K.N. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999))). 
66. Id. at 1275 (citing Boston Inv. Prop. # 1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 
658 A.2d 515, 517 (R.I.1995)). 
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“[d]espite defendants’ argument, this Court does not require that 
the commercial entities be ‘sophisticated.’ Rather, it is inherent in 
the very nature of a commercial entity that it is indeed 
sophisticated when compared with a consumer.”67 
The Rhode Island Residential Landlord-Tenant Act is distinct 
from Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18.1, “Commercial 
Leasing and Other Estates,” which by its definition does not 
involve residential landlord-tenant relationships.68 Hence, the 
subject of this Article involves protection of the consumer, not a 
dispute between commercial entities, and would therefore not be 
barred by the economic loss rule. 
As previously discussed, it is entirely foreseeable that a 
former tenant would suffer financial injury due to damaged 
creditworthiness or credit rating, or a collection account. If the 
collection account or the unsubstantiated amount furnished to a 
CRA is the sole factor, or a major factor, that caused financial 
injury to the tenant, the landlord may be held liable for damages 
resulting from “going rogue” by avoiding the two Act sections and 
using self-help to furnish or attempt to recover on an amount not 
first reduced to a judgment. 
A former tenant who prevails on the negligence action may 
recover based upon the financial or economic injury inflicted by 
the landlord’s failure to follow the proscribed procedure of the two 
sections of the Act. Thus, a landlord who engages in self-help 
recovery of damages in a dispute following lease termination may, 
ironically, end up owing the former tenant more on a judgment 
than what the landlord would have claimed in a civil action for 
damages. 
V. WHAT ABOUT THE RHODE ISLAND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
ACT (RIDTPA)? 
A private right of action under the RIDTPA is created by 
statute for, in part, “[a]ny person who . . . leases goods or services 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and thereby 
 
 
67. Id. at 1277. 
68. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18.1-1 (2017) (“This chapter shall apply to all 
commercial properties and other estates, excluding residential properties 
governed by the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, chapter 18 of this 
title.”). 
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suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or 
personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person 
of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by [section] 6-13.1- 
2.”69 
This cause of action would arguably only be available in 
limited circumstances because the RIDTPA’s applicability for a 
private cause of action is limited to “goods and services,” and 
therefore may not be applicable depending on the facts and 
whether a court interprets its applicability to a landlord tenant 
relationship.70 However, if the premises involved, perhaps, a 
furnished apartment, the appliances in the apartment may 
constitute “goods.”71 Likewise, the landlord’s services in 
maintaining the premises in a safe and habitable condition may  
be “services” subject to the RIDTPA.72 Such factual issues would 
control whether a former tenant could plead the prima facie 
elements of a claim under the RIDTPA. If the dispute arose over 
some damaged furniture in a leased apartment, the RIDTPA may 
apply. Otherwise, a former tenant should be cautious in pleading 
under this statute lest it be dismissed on summary judgment or a 
Rule 12 motion to dismiss. 
A threshold question would be whether the former tenant was 
leasing goods and/or services. That being determined, we would 
move on. To find whether a trade practice violates the RIDTPA, a 
Rhode Island court considers several factors: 
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been 
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it 
has been established by statutes, the common law, or 
otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least 
the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other 
established concept of unfairness; 
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; 
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or 
competitors or other businessmen).73 
 
69. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a) (2017). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. Ames v. Oceanside Welding & Towing Co. Inc., 767 A.2d 677, 681 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that “plaintiffs need not 
establish every factor, and they may prove unfairness by showing 
that a trade practice meets one factor to a great degree or two or 
three factors to a lesser degree.”74 
Let us focus primarily on the first factor. Without belaboring 
the point, the Court’s use of “public policy,” “statutes,” 
“penumbra,” and “statutory” in this context all indicate that 
having a public policy in place, particularly one rooted in a 
statute, is crucial to determining whether a practice is unfair or 
deceptive.75 Enter the two sections of the Act, in that a landlord’s 
failure to comply with sections 34-18-43 and 34-18-5(a) “offend” 
public policy “as it has been established” by “statute” in a simple 
plain reading of the Act’s two sections.76 These two sections of the 
Act were specifically designed to give residential tenants and 
landlords a statutorily devised procedure for resolving disputes 
following a tenant’s termination of a lease without the landlord 
taking arbitrary or self-help action against the former tenant. In 
this sense, a landlord’s self-help attempt at the recovery of 
monetary damages would be akin to an unlawful ouster, and 
contrary to “at least the penumbra of some common-law, 
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness.”77 The Act, 
specifically sections 34-18-43 and 34-18-5(a), shows the 
Legislature’s intent to ensure a proper procedure for the 
resolution of such disputes, such that the tenants would not be 
harmed by arbitrary and capricious self-help actions by the 
landlord in the event that the tenants believed termination to be 
necessary. Rhode Island General Laws section 34-18-43 protects 
the interests of both the landlord and tenant by providing a cause 
of action whereby both parties may be heard, and a final decision 
rendered on the merits.78 
As to the second factor, the landlord’s conduct in our 
hypothetical would satisfy this prong if the landlord utilized self- 
help for recovery of damages by failing to follow sections 34-18-43 
 
(R.I. 2001) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 
n.5 (1972)) (emphasis added). 
74. Long v. Dell, 93 A.3d 988, 1001 (R.I. 2014). 
75. Id. at 1000. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-43 (2017). 
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and 34-18-5(a), perhaps in an attempt to save money on court 
costs and attorney’s fees, and thereby failed to provide the former 
tenants with the judicial procedure they would be entitled to by 
virtue of these two sections of the Act.79 Instead, our hypothetical 
landlord avoided the court and decided to, as the colloquialism 
goes, become judge, jury, and executioner by arbitrarily 
determining an amount without regard to mitigation and the 
procedures set forth by the Act. Such conduct would almost 
certainly meet the definition of “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous”80 on its face. Moreover, the landlord had a 
statutory procedure to use in the first place and disregarded it. 
As to the third and final factor, there is absolutely no doubt 
that this type of conduct would cause “substantial injury” to the 
former tenants, who are consumers, and that the same or similar 
conduct toward other tenants in the future would do the same.81  
A former tenant’s reputation, creditworthiness, and financial well- 
being are at stake. A collection account or unpaid balance on a 
credit report can wreak havoc on that consumer’s ability to obtain 
a mortgage, purchase or lease a car, lease an apartment 
elsewhere, or move on with his or her financial life. This is within 
the realm of common knowledge. If the former tenant was given 
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the merits, depending on 
the facts of the case, any amount, no amount, or something in 
between may have been owed. But, at the very least, there would 
be no practical or useful need for the landlord to even furnish the 
amount to a CRA or TPDC in the first place. 
In sum, assuming goods or services are involved in the post- 
termination of the lease dispute, a landlord’s conduct could very 
well be found deceptive within the meaning of Rhode Island 
General Laws section 6-13.1-2, which states that “[u]nfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.”82 
For a violation found under this statute, the court may award 
“actual damages or two hundred dollars ($200), whichever is 
greater”83 and “[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive 
 
79. See Long, 93 A.3d at 1000 (citation omitted). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (2017). 
83. Id. 
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damages and may provide other equitable relief that it deems 
necessary or proper” as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs.84 
Larry Landlord’s conduct may even warrant the imposition of 
punitive damages, as is allowed in the discretion of the court 
pursuant to section 6-13.1-5.2(a), as an effective deterrent to 
future landlords engaging in similar harmful conduct against 
former tenants. As a threshold matter, it should be noted that, 
although a landlord may have a claim against the former tenant 
for monies due and owing, punitive damages are not available in a 
breach of contract claim “absent the most egregious 
circumstances.”85 At this point, it should be reiterated that the 
cause of action by the former tenant against the landlord for 
punitive damages under the RIDTPA would not be grounded in a 
breach of contract claim, but rather that the landlord failed to 
comply with the two sections of the Act as against public policy.  
In that sense, the landlord’s conduct might well fall into the 
categories of “bad faith, illegality, misconduct, or any other factor 
that might alter the legal relationship of [the] parties” which may 
be grounds for a punitive damages award.86 In other words, if the 
landlord proceeds against the former tenant using statutorily 
proscribed procedure mandated by the two sections in the Rhode 
Island Landlord Tenant Act, then the former tenant would almost 
certainly have no claim under the RIDTPA, and punitive damages 
should not even be meaningfully considered, because the landlord 
would have proceeded according to the statute. By contrast, it is 
no longer a simple breach of contract action if the landlord goes 
rogue and attempts to engage in self-help to collect the alleged 
damages or furnish it to a CRA. 
Accordingly, if the landlord’s conduct is found to be deceptive 
within the meaning of Rhode Island General Laws section 6-13.1-
2, et seq., the former tenant may plead for actual plus punitive 
damages as well as equitable relief for the landlord to 
 
84. Id. 
85. O’Coin v. Woonsocket Inst. Tr. Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1266–67 (R.I. 
1988). 
86. See Chapman v. Vendresca, 426 A.2d 262, 264 (R.I. 1981) (holding 
that punitive damages for a breach of contract to purchase real estate require 
evidence “of fraud, bad faith, illegality, misconduct, or any other factor that 
might alter the legal relationship of the[] parties”). 
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immediately cease and desist collection activity and to take all 
immediate actions to remove the collection account from the 
former tenant’s credit reports. Furthermore, the former tenant 
could enjoin the landlord from reporting the alleged debt to any 
other TPDC or CRA, and thereby limit the landlord to only pursue 
rights and remedies he or she may have in accordance with state 
law. 
Again, it is important to note that whether a former tenant 
would be able to meritoriously plead under the RIDTPA would 
turn on whether goods or services were involved, absent a more 
expansive interpretation by the court of the RIDTPA’s 
applicability. The point, nonetheless, is the general proposition 
that because of the existence of the Act’s two sections, the former 
tenant may be able to meet the elements of various negligence and 
consumer protection-based claims that otherwise would not be 
available. With express statutory public policy in place, the  
former tenant may be able to meet a crucial element under the 
RIDPTA, which is, as discussed earlier, whether there is public 
policy or a statute in place for the protection of such persons.87 
Whether or not a particular former tenant is able to plead under 
the RIDTPA or not, it should nonetheless alert landlords, debt 
collectors, and parties to insolvency proceedings that there may be 
claims or defenses against landlord-based claims for damages 
because of the two sections of the Act.88 The RIDTPA claim is a 
possibility, but should be read here as more of an example of 
claims that could be raised against a self-help rogue landlord or its 
agent. 
CONCLUSION 
A landlord may believe that an amount of damages is owed 
following termination of the lease. However, depending on the 
facts of the dispute—for example, whether it involves goods and/or 
services, use and occupation, and so forth—there is no set of facts 
under which a landlord could utilize self-help to recover the 
amount without some level of risk. While some conjure up images 
of furniture on the sidewalk and changed locks when thinking of 
 
 
87. See Long v. Dell, Inc., 93 A.3d 988, 1000 (R.I. 2014) (citation 
omitted). 
88. 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-5, -43 (2017). 
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the phrase “self-help,” it is crucial to remember that although self- 
help for possession is an ongoing and real-world problem, self-help 
can exist purely in the financial realm without all the physical 
fanfare of such conduct. The risk to the landlord is created by a 
public policy inherently found in these two sections of the Act. As 
a public policy created for the protection of former tenants, these 
former tenants can then utilize the failure of the landlord to follow 
the very statutory procedure designed to protect the tenants as 
the basis for other claims that require such public policy as a 
condition of meeting an element. Negligence, or the RIDPTA, are 
only possible examples presented herein. However, a former 
tenant financially or economically affected by a landlord’s failure 
to follow the Act should not simply give up and resign his or 
herself to financial ruin and misery. On the other side, the 
landlord should protect itself by following the statutory procedure 
required by the two sections of the Act following a lease 
termination or else risk unnecessary exposure to claims by a 
former tenant that otherwise would be extinguished. 
The Rhode Island Landlord Tenant Act is full of possibilities 
based on its inherent public policy of protecting the tenant as a 
consumer. In this regard, the Act is very much a consumer 
protection statute. To unleash the Act’s full potential, a former 
tenant and a landlord should be mindful of the consequences of 
having a public policy in place in the form of a statutory scheme 
and what other causes of action that may potentially  trigger. 
Even if negligence or the RIDPTA may not be available in a 
particular situation, other causes of action may be available 
simply by the landlord taking arbitrary self-help action against 
the former tenant for self-help recovery of damages. Remember: 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that there is “no set 
formula”89 for finding a legal duty of care, but that same duty of 
care is the key to unlock so many potential claims and defenses. 
That does not, however, mean that any claim or defense survives 
in a post-lease termination scenario. It simply means that former 
tenants should stay mindful, and landlords should refrain from 
“going rogue.” 
89. Brown v. Stanley, 84 A.3d 1157, 1162 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Willis v. 
Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 130 (R.I. 2008)). 
